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I. INTRODUCTION 
The election of Barack Obama and the coming of a new 
administration in the White House are certain to mean a number 
of changes in the United States’ approach to fighting terrorism and 
maintaining national security.  Among the changes that have been 
at the top of many lists are the closing down of the detention 
facility at Guantánamo Bay, the repeal of the Military Commissions 
Act (MCA), and the cessation of prosecutions by military 
commission.1
 
       †  Associate Professor of Law, New England Law, in Boston, Massachusetts.  
Thanks to my research assistant, Jillian Cavanaugh, for her excellent support. 
  The detention, treatment, and prosecution of 
captured enemy combatants by the Bush administration have been 
 1. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. 
Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing_room/executive_orders/. 
1
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singled out for criticism as the worst aspects of that administration’s 
program to fight terrorism.2  In addition, the Bush administration 
has suffered a string of defeats in cases brought before the United 
States Supreme Court challenging various aspects of the military 
commissions.3
The criticisms of and the legal challenges to the military 
commissions fell along a broad spectrum, from arguments that the 
President lacked the authority to unilaterally create a military 
commissions system, to attacks on specific aspects of the military 
commissions system.
 
4  Interestingly, some of the most pointed—
and ultimately most effective—challenges to the Bush 
administration’s program centered on various evidentiary issues.5
The initial military commissions program created controversial 
rules for the use of secret and protected evidence.
 
6  These initial 
rules allowed for certain protected evidence to be used against a 
defendant even though the defendant and his civilian attorney 
could be denied access to this evidence at all stages of the 
proceeding.7  This rule was criticized not only by commentators 
and academics,8 but by many military lawyers, including the top 
lawyers of each military branch, as a violation of the basic 
protections afforded by Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.9
 
 2. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Article II: The Uses and Abuses of Executive Power, 62 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 187 (2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan  v.  
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 4. See Tim Golden, Threats and Responses: Tough Justice: After Terror, a Secret 
Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at A11.  
 5. See Eun Young Choi, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the 
Evidentiary Rules of Military Commissions in the War Against Terrorism, 42 HARV. C.R-
C.L. L. REV. 139, 189 (2007).  
 6. See Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1962, 1973 
(2005). 
 7. See id. at 1972; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 614. 
 8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN & VICTOR HANSEN, THE CASE FOR CONGRESS: 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming 2009). 
 9. See Memoranda from Thomas J. Romig, Judge Advocate Gen., to Senator 
Lindsey Graham (July 25, 2005) (on file with author); see also Jane Mayer, The 
Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, 
THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32; Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, 
Legal Advisor to the Dep’t of State, to Counsel to the President, Comments on Your 
Paper on the Geneva Conventions (Feb. 2, 2002) (on file with author).    
  In United States v. Hamdan, the Supreme 
Court struck down President Bush’s initial military commissions 
2
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order.10  The Court held that the rules regarding secret evidence 
were unauthorized departures from the uniformity requirements 
between the rules and procedures for courts-martial and military 
commissions.11
Another evidentiary criticism of Guantánamo and the military 
commissions system was that confessions and derivative evidence 
obtained by torture and coercion could possibly be used in military 
commissions.
   
12  Even after the Supreme Court struck down the 
Bush administration’s system for military commissions in Hamdan, 
evidence obtained by coercion has nonetheless remained a part of 
the military commissions procedure under the Military 
Commissions Act.13
Still another criticism of detainee treatment at Guantánamo 
focused on the unlawful-enemy-combatant-status determination.  
Under the procedures established by the military, a Combat Status 
Review Tribunal (CSRT) made the initial factual determination as 
to whether a detainee was in fact an unlawful enemy combatant.
 
14  
An Administrative Review Board would then make annual 
reassessments to determine whether the detainee remained a 
continuing threat.15  The procedures, and particularly the evidence 
needed for the government to meet its burden for continued 
detention, have been criticized as lacking any semblance of fair 
process.16
 
 10. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634. 
 11. Id. at 624–25. 
 12. See, e.g., Press Release, Jen Nessel, Ctr. For Constitutional Rights, CRR 
Challenges Validity of Military Commissions and Use of Torture Evidence in New 
Death Penalty Case (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://ccrjustice.org/ 
newsroom/press-releases/ccr-challenges-validity-military-comissions-and-use-
torture-evidence-new-dea.  
 13. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 948r, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006) 
[hereinafter MCA]. 
 14. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. on the Implementation of 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at 
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 3 (Jul. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. 
 15. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. on Revised Implementation 
of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. 
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 6 (Jul. 14, 2006), available at http://www. 
defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf. 
 16. See, e.g., ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, TASK FORCE ON 
TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS (Feb. 10, 2003), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abarpt21003cmbtnts.
pdf.     
  The procedures were also created in such a way that it 
was very difficult for a detainee to introduce evidence to challenge 
3
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the factual basis for his detention.17  The Supreme Court recently 
ruled that the CSRT process was not an adequate substitute for 
habeas corpus.18
Even ardent supporters of this most recent use of military 
commissions to try enemy combatants must concede that the 
commissions were a failure.  In the seven years since the first plan 
for the commissions was announced, only a few suspects have been 
prosecuted,
 
19 and the outcome of these prosecutions hardly seems 
to justify the government’s enormous effort and expense.  The 
results in individual cases have proven to be much less than the 
government had asked for, and the Supreme Court has reviewed 
the legality of the commissions system on four occasions and found 
its structure wanting in every case.20
At this writing, President Obama has signed an executive order 
directing that the Guantánamo Bay detention facility be closed 
within one year.
   
21  The President also ordered that a study be 
conducted to examine the best way to detain and try terrorist 
suspects in a manner consistent with American national security 
and foreign policy interests and the interests of justice.22
Regardless of what ultimately happens to these suspects and 
irrespective of the fact that the dismantling of Guantánamo may 
close a sad chapter in the United States’ fight against terrorism, the 
book on many of these very thorny evidence issues remains open.  
This will likely not be the last occasion the United States 
government and the military will choose to prosecute suspected war 
criminals under a military commissions paradigm.  Military 
commissions have been a part of American legal history since the 
beginning of the Republic and have played a role in most major 
  As with 
any project this complex, there may not be an easy way to detain 
and try these terrorist suspects in any forum, and there is little 
doubt that the devil will be in the details. 
 
 17. See Memorandum from Sec’y of the Navy on Implementation of 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, § G (Jul. 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf. 
 18. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260 (2008). 
 19. See David J.R. Frakt, An Indelicate Imbalance: A Critical Comparison of the 
Rules and Procedures for Military Commissions and Courts-Martial, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
315, 317–20 (2007). 
 20. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577 (2006); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 21. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 22. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009).    
4
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conflicts, including the Revolutionary War, Civil War, and World 
War II.23
II. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
There are a host of issues that one could explore in search of 
lessons to learn from these recent military commissions.  But this 
article will focus on the evidence rules that were initially developed 
for the military commissions, as well as the evidence rules that were 
ultimately adopted.  From this focus, hopefully, one can better 
understand why the Bush administration and, ultimately, Congress 
settled on the rules that they did.  Focusing on the evidence rules 
may also be instructive as politicians and policymakers consider 
what to do with the remaining terrorist suspects at Guantánamo.   
  In addition, even with the closing of Guantánamo, there 
will be a number of terrorist suspects who will face trial in some 
forum.  If this forum and any future commissions are to enjoy 
legitimacy, we must learn from the failures of this most recent 
attempt to use military commissions.   
The abandonment of the rules of evidence, which form the 
backbone of any military court-martial or criminal prosecution in 
federal court, remains one of the most striking aspects of the Bush 
administration’s military commissions plan.24
Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the 
Presiding Officer (or instead, if any other member of the 
Commission so requests at the time the Presiding Officer 
renders that opinion, the opinion of the Commission 
rendered at that time by a majority of the Commission), 
the evidence would have probative value to a reasonable 
person.
  The very first order 
implementing the military commissions rejected this structure; 
instead, it implemented a general relevancy standard for the 
admissibility of all types of evidence.  The rules of evidence stated 
simply that:  
25
 
 23. See Kathleen T. Rhem, Long History Behind Military Commissions, AM. 
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 19, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25489. 
 24. The Military Rules of Evidence model the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
most aspects.  See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text (noting similarities 
between the Military Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 
rules for hearsay, character evidence, impeachment of witnesses, expert testimony, 
and authentication). 
 
 25. DEP’T OF DEF. MILITARY COMM’N ORDER NO. 1, PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY 
MILITARY COMM’NS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST 
5
Hansen: The Usefulness of a Negative Example: What We Can Learn about Evi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] MILITARY COMMISSION EVIDENCE RULES 1485 
The Bush administration maintained this approach in later 
modifications to the military commissions order,26
(ii) Hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under 
 and, even under 
the Military Commissions Act, the rules of evidence followed this 
more open and loose relevance standard by crafting evidentiary 
rules that state:  
(A) Evidence shall be admissible if the military judge 
determines that the evidence would have probative value 
to a reasonable person. 
. . .  
(C) A statement of the accused that is otherwise 
admissible shall not be excluded from trial by military 
commission on grounds of alleged coercion or 
compulsory self-incrimination so long as the evidence 
complies with the provisions of section 948r of this title. 
(D) Evidence shall be admitted as authentic so long as— 
(i) the military judge of the military commission 
determines that there is sufficient basis to find that 
the evidence is what it is claimed to be; and 
(ii) the military judge instructs the members that they 
may consider any issue as to authentication or 
identification of evidence in determining the weight, 
if any, to be given to the evidence. 
(E) (i) Except as provided in clause (ii), hearsay evidence 
not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence 
applicable in trial by general courts-martial may be 
admitted in a trial by military commission if the 
proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse 
party, sufficiently in advance to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, the intention 
of the proponent to offer the evidence, and the 
particulars of the evidence (including information on the 
general circumstances under which the evidence was 
obtained). The disclosure of evidence under the 
preceding sentence is subject to the requirements and 
limitations applicable to the disclosure of classified 
information in section 949j(c) of this title. 
 
TERRORISM 9 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter ORDER NO. 1]. 
 26. DEP’T OF DEF. MILITARY COMM’N ORDER NO. 1, PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY 
MILITARY COMM’NS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST 
TERRORISM (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf [hereinafter REVISED ORDER NO. 1]. 
6
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the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general 
courts-martial shall not be admitted in a trial by 
military commission if the party opposing the 
admission of the evidence demonstrates that the 
evidence is unreliable or lacking in probative value. 
(F) The military judge shall exclude any evidence the 
probative value of which is substantially outweighed— 
(i) by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the commission; or 
(ii) by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.27
The magnitude of the initial military commissions approach to 
evidence was quite staggering in its scope.  Gone were the hearsay 
rule and its recognized exceptions, the privilege rules, the 
prohibitions against character evidence, the requirements for 
authentication, the preferences for the defendant to have the 
opportunity to confront his accusers, and a host of other rules 
found in the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence.
   
28  In their 
place, the military judge was instructed that the fact finders can 
consider any evidence that a reasonable person would consider to 
have probative value.29
But this reason alone does not fully answer the question.  After 
all, the defendant could also benefit from this new relaxed 
  As any new evidence student quickly learns, 
this standard is an extremely low one that greatly favors 
admissibility.  Why was the government so quick to abandon these 
established rules of evidence?   
One possibility is that many, if not most, of the rules governing 
military commissions were designed by the government for the 
primary purpose of making cases easier to prove, and that, without 
relaxing the rules, the government’s ability to obtain convictions 
would be severely weakened.  Boiling down the rules of evidence to 
a case-by-case relevancy analysis makes the government’s job of 
satisfying its burden of proof much easier. 
 
 27. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 949a (2006). 
 28. It should be noted that the Manual for Military Commissions, which was 
created to implement the provisions of the MCA, restored several evidence rules 
in a manner consistent with the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence.  
Nonetheless, even under the Manual, hearsay evidence remains presumptively 
permissible, and the specific exception categories under the Federal and Military 
Rules of Evidence were replaced with a rule favoring broad admissibility.  Likewise, 
the rules of authentication are significantly relaxed when compared to the federal 
or military rules.  See infra notes 120–28 and accompanying text. 
 29. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(A). 
7
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standard.  Nothing in the language of the commission rules 
suggests that an accused is held to a different standard.  The 
defendant does have limited access to the compulsory process of 
the military commissions and may have more difficulty obtaining 
evidence to begin with.30  But even so, that does not necessarily 
mean that these reduced evidence rules would only favor the 
government.  A defendant who is unable to call a live witness may 
be able to admit a statement from that witness on his behalf, even 
though the statement is pure hearsay and does not fall under any 
recognized exception.31
This article will first discuss the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) and the Military Rules of Evidence and explain why 
these provisions were created and how they were to be applied 
within the full spectrum of military operations.
 
So the question remains, why abandon the rules of evidence in 
the military commissions?  One possible explanation could be that 
abandoning the rules is a tacit admission that the rules of evidence 
simply do not work, or at least do not work well.  It may also be that 
the rules of evidence function well in the tidy courtrooms of a 
federal court or a peace time court-martial, but combat may impose 
a new level of complexity on the criminal process.  Maybe the 
formal rules of evidence simply are not suited for combat.  Or it 
may be that the rules of evidence do not accurately reflect our core 
values and fundamental notions of fairness.  After all, many of the 
traditional evidence rules are a codification of an arcane common-
law system that may be detached from twenty-first-century realities.   
The military commissions give us an opportunity to explore 
some of these questions and to reflect on whether the procedures 
to try alleged foreign terrorists, or the procedures in future military 
commissions, should follow this same approach.  Looking back on 
the evidentiary scheme of the military commissions also provides an 
opportunity to reflect on the application of the rules of evidence in 
military courts-martial and other criminal prosecutions. 
32
 
 30. See 10 U.S.C. § 949j (granting defendants the right to compel the 
production of witnesses and evidence, but restricting that right if classified 
information is sought).  
 31. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (allowing the admission of hearsay 
evidence after that evidence is first disclosed to the opposing party). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
  The article will 
then compare the Military Rules of Evidence to the various 
evidentiary rules in the military commissions to illustrate why the 
8
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President ultimately settled on the approach reflected in the 
Manual for Military Commissions.33  Are these reasons credible, 
and were there other, perhaps unstated, reasons for the rule 
changes?34  Does our understanding of the change in evidentiary 
rules indicate that similar rationales can be applied to other 
criminal trials in the military context?35
This article also seeks to determine if we are at an evidence 
crossroad.  Are we at a point where we need to reexamine the way 
evidence is treated in military criminal cases tried under the 
UCMJ?
  
36  Should certain combat exceptions be written into the 
Military Rules of Evidence?37  Or are recent efforts to depart from 
the established rules of evidence in military commissions nothing 
more than an attempt to give the government an advantage over a 
class of defendants who it deems is not worthy of enjoying the full 
protections of a fair trial?38
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UCMJ AND MILITARY RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 
 
A. The UCMJ 
The conclusion of World War II saw a groundswell of support 
for reforms to the military justice system.39  During the war, many in 
uniform were subjected to what they believed was an unfair and 
arbitrary system of justice.40  In response, Congress held extensive 
hearings and ultimately drafted the UCMJ, which was signed into 
law by President Harry S. Truman in 1950.41  The UCMJ was seen as 
a compromise between proponents of individual rights and those 
who wanted to retain the commander as a source of virtually 
unlimited control over military justice.42
 
 33. See infra Part IV.   
 34. See infra Part V. 
 35. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 36. See infra Part VI. 
 37. See infra Part V.B. 
 38. See infra Part V.A. 
 39. See James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in 
the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185, 187–88 (2002). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) 
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950).  
 42. Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military 
Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 629, 637 (1994). 
  Since the enactment of 
9
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the code in 1951, there have been two significant amendments, one 
in 196843 and one in 1983.44
The 1951 UCMJ and its subsequent amendments provided 
individual soldiers with greater rights and protections than they 
previously possessed.  Some of the significant systemic changes 
included the establishment of the Military Service Courts of 
Review,
 
45 the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,46 and, 
ultimately, review by the United States Supreme Court.47  In 
particular, review by the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces was designed to be a check on the commander’s operation 
of the military justice system.  Other significant systemic reforms 
included the creation of the position of the military trial judge and 
the creation of the trial judiciary to appoint judges to individual 
courts-martial.48  Under Article 37 of the UCMJ, safeguards were 
created to prevent those participating in the court-martial, 
including the military judge, the attorneys, and the members, from 
suffering adverse personnel actions based on their participation in 
the court-martial.49  A number of other protections were put into 
place to prevent the risk of the commander attempting to 
unlawfully influence the court-martial process.50
A clear policy preference which emerged from the UCMJ’s 
 
 
 43. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as 
amended in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950). 
 44. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (codified as 
amended in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950). 
 45. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2006) (establishing 
that a review by this court is automatic for any sentence that includes a punitive 
discharge or a sentence to confinement of one year or more). 
 46. Id. § 867. 
 47. Id. § 867(a). 
 48. Id. § 826. 
 49. Id. § 837 (stating that the precautions were put in place to ensure the 
quality of judgments). 
 50. Id. § 834 (requiring the convening authority to obtain advice from a staff 
judge advocate (legal advisor to the commander) before any charge is referred to 
a general court-martial); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 
R.C.M. 306(a) (2008), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/ 
mcm2008.pdf (requiring that each commander exercise his or her own 
independent judgment as to the proper disposition of the case without influence 
from a superior authority).  In spite of these protections, unlawful command 
influence continues to plague the military justice system.  Many of the reported 
cases by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and its predecessor, the Court 
of Military Appeals, have dealt with this issue.  It is beyond the scope of this article 
to explore these issues in detail.  Suffice it to say that as appellate courts have 
recognized, unlawful influence is the “mortal enemy of military justice.”  United 
States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). 
10
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creation is that service members do not give up all of their 
individual rights when joining the military.  For the military to 
maintain a disciplined, effective, and loyal force, a balance between 
individual rights and the needs of the military organization was 
sought.  In attempting to reach that balance, the military turned to 
the civilian court system and adopted a number of its provisions.   
With the codification of the UCMJ came the creation of the 
Manual for Courts-Martial.51  The manual was promulgated by the 
President under the authority of Article 36 of the UCMJ, which 
delegates to the President the authority to prescribe the rules and 
regulations governing trials by courts-martial and trials by military 
commission.52  As further proof that Congress looked to the civilian 
courts for guidance on how to strike a fair balance, Article 36 
directs the President, as far as he deems practicable, to apply the 
principles of law and rules of evidence that are generally 
recognized in criminal cases in the United States district courts to 
trials by courts-martial and military commission.53
From the time that the UCMJ was passed in 1951 until the 
Military Rules of Evidence were implemented in 1980, the rules of 
evidence in military courts-martial generally followed developments 
in the common law of evidence.  Many of these common law rules 
and principles were codified, or at least commented on, in the 
accompanying Manual for Courts-Martial.
  This provision 
has particular relevance to the development of the Military Rules of 
Evidence. 
54
B. The Military Rules of Evidence   
 
In 1975, President Ford signed legislation implementing the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  Because Article 36(a) of the UCMJ 
required the military’s evidence rules to follow any federal rules as 
far as practicable,55
 
 51. President Truman issued the first Manual for Courts-Martial in 1951.  
Exec. Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1949–1953).  See MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL (2008), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-
2008.pdf, for the current version. 
 52. 10 U.S.C. § 836. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Fredric Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Implementation, 
130 MIL. L. REV. 5, 7 (1990). 
 55. 10 U.S.C. § 836. 
 efforts began to codify the Military Rules of 
Evidence after the creation of the federal rules.  These efforts 
culminated in March 1980 when President Carter issued an 
11
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executive order amending the Manual for Courts-Martial and 
promulgating the Military Rules of Evidence.56  The rules became 
effective on September 1, 1980.57
The philosophy that guided the military rules’ drafters was that 
military evidence law should be as consistent with civilian law as 
possible.
   
58  This philosophy is best reflected in Military Rule of 
Evidence 1102, which states that “[a]mendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence shall apply to the Military Rules of Evidence 
[eighteen] months after the effective date of such amendments 
unless the President takes action to the contrary.”59
Contrary to what one might expect, when the Military Rules of 
Evidence were drafted, they did not contain any military or combat 
exceptions.  For example, the hearsay exceptions under the 
Military Rules of Evidence read much like the federal rules with 
only a few minor changes.
  The 
presumption is that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be 
equally applicable in the military context. 
60  This is equally true with expert 
testimony,61 the character rules,62 the rules of impeachment,63 and 
the authentication rules.64
Not only did the drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence 
choose to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, but in the area of 
  One would think that, if there were any 
area where a combat or military contingency exception might have 
been written into the rules, it would be the rules admitting hearsay 
evidence and, perhaps, the rules setting out the authentication 
requirements.  A loosening of the rules, at least in the context of 
ongoing military operations, would arguably reduce the adverse 
impact that a court-martial might have on these operations.  
Nevertheless, the Military Rules of Evidence did not adopt such an 
approach.  Instead, the rules established that it is not impracticable 
for the military to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, regardless 
of the context. 
 
 56. Exec. Order No. 12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (Mar. 12, 1980). 
 57. Id. at pt. C. 
 58. Lederer, supra note 54, at 13. 
 59. MIL. R. EVID. 1102.   
 60. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8) (business records and public records 
hearsay exceptions), with MIL. R. EVID. 803(6), (8) (creating a broader list of 
business records and public records hearsay exceptions to include a number of 
uniquely military documents).   
 61. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 702 with FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 62. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608 with FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608. 
 63. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 609 with FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 64. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 901–02 with FED. R. EVID. 901–02.  
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privileges the Military Rules of Evidence went a step further.  
Rather than adopting the federal rules’ approach, which was not to 
codify the privilege rules and instead allow the rules to develop by 
common law,65 the Military Rules of Evidence specifically codified a 
number of privileges, including, for example, a spousal privilege,66 
an attorney-client privilege,67 and a classified information 
privilege.68
Since the implementation of the Military Rules of Evidence, 
military courts, like their federal counterparts, have proven adept 
at interpreting and applying the rules.  One of the best examples of 
this ability is in the area of expert testimony.  A question that vexed 
the federal courts after the passage of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was the extent to which the Frye
  
69 test for determining the 
reliability of expert testimony had been replaced by Federal Rule 
702.70  Years before the Supreme Court announced its holding in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow,71 the military courts grappled with this 
question and held that Military Rule of Evidence 702 had replaced 
Frye as the standard for admissibility of expert testimony.72
First, since the codification of the Military Rules of Evidence in 
   
In the years following the adoption of the Military Rules of 
Evidence, the military legal system embraced these rules and 
developed a rich and sophisticated body of case law interpreting 
and applying the rules in the military context.  Over this time, the 
Military Rules of Evidence have provided a workable balance 
between the rights of the individual and the needs of the military, 
and there has not been any significant movement within the 
military legal establishment to repeal or substantially modify them.  
There are, however, some interesting caveats. 
 
 65. See FED. R. EVID.  501. 
 66. MIL. R. EVID. 504. 
 67. MIL. R. EVID. 502. 
 68. MIL. R. EVID. 505. 
 69. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific 
evidence “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in 
the particular field in which it belongs” to be admissible at trial). 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing standards for the admission of expert 
testimony). 
 71. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that “general acceptance” is not a necessary 
precondition to admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and that a trial judge has the responsibility of ensuring that an expert’s 
testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand). 
 72. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1987) (permitting the result 
of a polygraph examination as evidence regarding statements of truthfulness). 
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1980 until the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 2001, the 
United States military had not been in a protracted war.  From 
1980–2001, while the military was frequently engaged in a number 
of military operations running the spectrum from peacekeeping to 
active combat, the events themselves were of relatively short 
duration.  Those operations that lasted for longer periods of time 
have generally been peacekeeping operations. This could mean 
that up to the time of the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the Military Rules of Evidence were not really tested in the 
crucible of combat.   
A development that has taken place over the past several years 
may also suggest that the UCMJ, in general, is less functional in a 
combat environment than intended.  Much is made of the need for 
the commander to maintain control of the forces under his 
command to ensure a disciplined fighting force.  It is a well-
accepted axiom that a commander conducting combat operations 
needs to have control over the military justice system so that system 
can be used as a means of enforcing and maintaining discipline 
over his forces.73  In reality, however, the practice is often quite 
different.  There are many situations where the combat 
commander has in fact given up control of cases to another military 
authority outside the theater of combat.74
 
 73. Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps?, 
28. SW. U. L. REV. 481, 534–41 (1999). 
 74. Some recent examples of this practice include the Akbar case, the Haditha 
prosecutions, and the Abu Ghraib prosecutions.  In the Akbar case, a solider 
charged with the murder and attempted murder of a number of his comrades on 
the eve of the invasion of Iraq was immediately sent back to the United States for 
trial within days of the incident.  See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Trial Opens for Sergeant 
Accused of Killing 2 Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A15.  The marines charged 
with the killings in Haditha have not been tried in the war theater but back at 
their home base in San Diego.  See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Struggle for Iraq: 
Investigation: Iraqis’ Accounts Link Marines to the Mass Killing of Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 29, 2006, at A1.  The soldiers charged with detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib 
prison were all removed from Iraq and were eventually tried in Fort Hood, Texas 
and other instillations in the United States.  See, e.g., Kate Zernike, The Conflict in 
Iraq: Abu Ghraib Scandal: Ringleader in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Is Sentenced to 10 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 112. 
  The practice of moving 
service members out of the theater of combat during a criminal 
investigation and subsequent court-martial is quite common.  The 
reason for this practice is understandable.  A commander engaged 
in combat operations may not want to be distracted with a criminal 
investigation and subsequent trial, particularly in serious cases 
which may demand a great deal of time, attention, and resources.  
14
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Instead, the commander may elect to keep those resources focused 
on combat operations, allowing a commander out of the theater to 
determine the disposition of the case.   
A second development over the past several years is that a 
great many offenses, particularly minor offenses that were 
previously prosecuted by a court-martial, are now resolved by other 
administrative means.  These methods are referred to as non-
judicial punishment and administrative actions, and these forums 
do not require the formal application of evidentiary rules.75
IV. MILITARY COMMISSIONS APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 
  This 
suggests that, for a large number of minor offenses, the military 
justice system operates outside of the formal rules of evidence.   
Even with these two caveats in mind, it can be said of the 
Military Rules of Evidence that since their adoption in 1980, the 
military legal culture has embraced them and, like their federal 
counterpart, these rules form the backbone of every criminal case 
tried in courts-martial.  When we look at the evidentiary rules put 
in place for the trial of enemy combatants under military 
commissions, we see a very different approach.  Given the military’s 
familiarity, competence, and experience with the Military Rules of 
Evidence, the President certainly could have simply transposed 
them over to the military commissions.  He did not do that. 
As noted above, the President’s initial order establishing the 
military commissions in March 2002 set out a general relevance 
standard as the only rule of evidence for the military commissions.76  
This standard did not require the presiding officer to conduct any 
balancing between admissibility and unfair prejudice, and 
relevance of the evidence would not be offset by other concerns.  
As long as the evidence had “probative value to a reasonable 
person,” it was admissible.77
 
 75. In 2006, the Army imposed nonjudicial punishment in 42,814 cases for a 
rate of 74.53 per thousand service members; the Navy and Marine Corps imposed 
nonjudicial punishment in 26,080 cases for a rate of 4.9 per thousand service 
members; and the Air Force imposed nonjudicial punishment in 7,616 cases for a 
rate of 21.78 per thousand service members.  See Annual Report Submitted to the 
Committees on Armed Services, CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUST., apps. 3–5 (2006), 
available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY06Annual Report.pdf. 
 76. ORDER NO. 1, supra note 25, at 9. 
 77. Id. 
  In addition, if the presiding officer 
were to conclude that the evidence did not have probative value to 
a reasonable person, that decision could be overturned by a 
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majority of the commission, and the evidence would be 
considered.78
The first modification to the commissions’ process came in 
August 2005.
 
79  This order rescinded the initial commissions order 
and set out a new and somewhat different process for the trial of 
enemy combatants in military commissions.  With respect to the 
evidence procedures, some minor modifications were made on how 
protected evidence would be treated.  Otherwise, it left the general 
relevancy rule from the first order in place.80  It was this order that 
the Supreme Court reviewed and ultimately struck down in 
Hamdan.81
In Hamdan, the Court noted that Article 36 of the UCMJ does 
not absolutely prevent military commissions from establishing 
procedures different from those in Article III courts, courts-martial, 
or other military tribunals.
   
82  For those differences to comply with 
Article 36, however, certain conditions must be met.83  First, the 
President must determine that it would be impracticable to apply 
the procedures of federal district courts to military commissions.84  
The Court found that the President had made that determination, 
and the Court gave him complete deference as to that decision.85
Second, according to the Court, Article 36 requires another 
determination before military commissions procedures could 
depart from those used in courts-martial.
   
86  Under Article 36(b), 
the President must determine that it is impracticable for military 
commissions and courts-martial to have uniform procedures.87  The 
historical reasons for the uniformity of procedures between military 
commissions and courts-martial are twofold.88  The difference 
between military commissions and courts-martial was originally 
jurisdiction alone, and such a difference would not justify a 
separate set of procedural rules for each forum.89
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Revised Order No. 1, supra note 26, at 11–12. 
 80. Id. at 10. 
 81. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 620. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2006). 
 85. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 623. 
 86. Id. at 623–24. 
 87. Id. at 620. 
 88. Id. at 617. 
 89. Id.  
  More 
importantly, uniformity was required to “protect against abuse and 
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ensure evenhandedness under the pressures of war.”90  The Court 
held that there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that it 
would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules to military 
commissions.91  The Court further concluded that the absence of 
any showing why the rules for courts-martial were impracticable was 
particularly disturbing in light of the clear and admitted failure to 
apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded by the 
Manual for Courts-Martial and the UCMJ—the right of the accused 
to be present.92  Accordingly, the Court ruled that the military 
commissions procedures violated Article 36 of the UCMJ.93
Following the Hamdan decision, Congress and the President 
acted quickly to create a military commissions system that reflected 
their collective determination as to which court-martial rules and 
procedures would be impracticable in the commissions’ context.
  The 
military commissions were invalid because the President and 
Congress had not determined that it was impracticable to follow 
court-martial rules and procedures, including the Military Rules of 
Evidence. 
94  
Out of this process came the evidentiary rules found in Section 
949a(b) of the MCA.95  For the most part, the evidence rules 
contained in the MCA are similar to the earlier commissions’ rules.  
The MCA rules continue to use general relevancy as the standard 
and, in addition, specifically articulate how to apply the general 
relevance standard with hearsay evidence and authentication.96  
The one additional feature of the MCA rules is that now the 
military judge conducts not only a relevancy analysis similar to 
Military Rule of Evidence 401, but also does a legal relevancy 
analysis very similar to a Rule 403 determination.97
 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 623.  
 92. Id. at 624. 
 93. Id. at 625. 
 94. See id. at 623–24 (stating that because the president failed to demonstrate 
that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in the case at hand, 
court-martial rules applied).  Hamdan  was decided on June 29, 2006.  Id. at 557.  
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 on October 17, 2006.  
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006)). 
 95. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b). 
 96. Id. § 949a(b)(2). 
 97. Id. § 949a(b)(2)(F). 
  So while the 
MCA rules were more robust then the earlier commissions’ rules, 
they were still a far cry from what is contained in the Military Rules 
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of Evidence.  These MCA rules, however, were not the last word on 
the subject. 
After the MCA was passed, the Secretary of Defense 
promulgated the Manual for Military Commissions (MMC).98  The 
MMC was written under the authority of Section 949a(a) of the 
MCA to establish a detailed set of rules to govern military 
commissions trials.99  To the extent practicable and consistent with 
intelligence activities, section 949a(a) requires the Secretary of 
Defense to apply the principles of law and rules of evidence for 
trials by general courts-martial.100  The consequence of this 
requirement was that the rules of evidence now contained in the 
MMC in many respects are a mirror image of the Military Rules of 
Evidence.101  Two key exceptions, however, remain.  Hearsay 
evidence is still presumptively admissible, and the specific 
exception categories under the Federal and Military Rules of 
Evidence are replaced by a general rule of admissibility for hearsay 
evidence.102  The rules of authentication are also significantly 
relaxed when compared to the federal and military rules.103
V. RATIONALES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS EVIDENCE RULES 
 
From their initial inception until this final implementation, 
the rules of evidence for military commissions have undergone 
significant changes.  In place of the initial skeleton rules of general 
relevance, the commissions ultimately have a set of rules, which, 
 
 98. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2007) [hereinafter MMC], available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/MANUAL%20FOR%20MILITARY%20COM 
MISSIONS%202007%20signed.pdf. 
 99. 10 U.S.C.§ 949a(a) (2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Compare, e.g., MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 404 with MIL. R. EVID. 404 
(admissibility of character evidence). The Military Commission Rules of Evidence 
are located in Part III of the Manual for Military Commissions.  MMC, supra note 
98, pt. III. 
 102. Compare MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay may be admitted on the 
same terms as any other form of evidence except as provided by these rules or by 
any Act of Congress applicable in trials by military commissions.”) with MIL. R. 
EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by any 
Act of Congress applicable in trials by court-martial.”). 
 103. Compare MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 901 (allowing evidence to be admitted as 
authentic if military judge so determines and instructs commission members to 
consider authenticity of evidence when weighing the evidence) with MIL. R. EVID. 
901–02 (requiring proponent of evidence to authenticate it before it can be 
admitted). 
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with two notable and significant exceptions,104
Finding a clear, consistent articulation from the Bush 
administration as to why it elected to try these enemy combatants 
by military commissions rather than courts-martial or in federal 
court is not an easy task to begin with, and it becomes even more 
difficult to find a clear explanation as to why the Military Rules of 
Evidence were initially thought to be unsuitable for military 
commissions.  In his order on November 13, 2001, President Bush 
stated that “[g]iven the danger to the safety of the United States 
and the nature of international terrorism,”
 look quite similar to 
the Military and Federal Rules of Evidence.  If this is where we have 
ended up, why did the President initially order such an extreme 
departure from the Military Rules of Evidence, and why did the 
final military commissions evidence rules take a different approach 
to hearsay and authentication?   
105 non-citizens would be 
detained and, when tried, would be tried by military tribunals.106  
Subsequent statements by administration and Pentagon officials 
elaborated on this theme.  One administration official stated that 
the President’s principal objective in using military commissions 
was to “set up a body of rules that will allow us to protect 
information to achieve additional intelligence gathering purposes 
that may lead to the capture of more terrorists.”107  Other officials 
noted that the commission order “capitalize[s] on the flexibility 
needed because of the increased need to protect intelligence 
information that occurs during an armed conflict.”108
 
 104. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.  See generally Choi, supra 
note 5, at 157–58. 
 105. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted 
in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006) (notes). 
 106. See id.  
 107. News Transcript, Senior Defense Official, Background Briefing on 
Military Comm’ns, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Jul. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2797.     
 108. News Transcript, Senior Defense Official, Background Briefing on the 
Release of Military Comm’n Instructions, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (May 2, 2003), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030502-0144.html.    
   
Often, however, these statements lacked any specific 
articulation defining the necessity of particular rules dealing with 
protected information.  John Altenburg, selected by the Secretary 
of Defense to serve as the Appointing Authority for the military 
commissions, articulated the rationale for the military commissions 
as follows:  
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[T]he government chose for many different reasons to 
use a military commission process.  It doesn’t mean that 
the others were wrong.  It just means that the government 
chose on balance, given the nature of the allegations that 
were being made and I think especially national security 
interests, that they chose to use the commission process, 
thinking that that would meet the balanced needs.109
Unfortunately, the President and Congress were no clearer in 
their reasoning behind the evidence rules put forth in the MCA 
   
This is hardly a clear and specific explanation of the rationale for 
military commissions, and it certainly allows one to question the 
administration’s motives.   
The explanations are even less clear when we ask more 
pointed questions.  For example, how does the abandonment of 
the hearsay rules, or the character rules, or the impeachment rules, 
as was done under the initial commission orders, necessarily 
enhance national security or protect classified information?  There 
does not seem to be any clear answer.  If protecting classified 
information was not the primary or only motivation for replacing 
the evidence rules with one general relevance rule, then perhaps 
there are other reasons.   
One explanation could be that the military commissions were 
intended to be courts of expediency.  Quite literally, there was the 
possibility that these trials could occur on the battlefield and in the 
heat of battle.  In such an environment, expediency and the need 
to protect our forces and interests against enemy threats may 
dictate a form of “rough justice” where all of the procedural 
niceties of the rules of evidence do not have a place. 
Another possibility is that, even if the trial itself is not 
conducted in the heat of battle, those who may be asked to 
participate as witnesses and commission members may be engaged 
in combat or other important duties related to national defense.  It 
could be that the more formal rules were replaced with a general 
rule of relevancy recognizing that there would be too great of an 
impact on national security if one required members of the military 
and others to be taken away from their important duties to serve as 
witnesses in military commissions.   
 
 109. News Transcript, John Altenburg, Appointing Authority for the Office of 
Military Commissions, Def. Dep’t Briefing on Military Comm’n Hearings, U.S. 
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and the MMC.  To claim that the evidence rules contained in the 
MMC reflect the President’s and Congress’s thoughtful 
determination as to why certain evidentiary rules would be 
impractical in the military commissions context is a stretch.  When 
one looks at the actual rules contained in the MMC, I believe that 
there are primarily two possible explanations for the military 
commissions’ departure from the Military Rules of Evidence.  
Neither of these explanations has been stated by any Bush 
administration official, member of Congress, or by anyone within 
the Defense Department.  Nonetheless, I believe that both of these 
explanations serve as the underlying rationale for the military 
commissions’ departure from the established Military Rules of 
Evidence. 
One reason for the different evidence rules for military 
commissions was a belief by Bush administration officials that 
unlawful enemy combatants tried by military commission simply 
did not deserve the protections afforded by the full application of 
the Military Rules of Evidence.  The other explanation for why the 
commissions rules reflected in the MMC expanded the use of 
hearsay evidence and rejected more formal authentication 
requirements is the belief that the Military Rules of Evidence have 
proven to be too cumbersome to apply during a time of war and in 
active theaters of combat.  The military commissions simply 
presented the first opportunity to craft more flexible rules from a 
clean slate.  
A. The National Security Rationale 
The first explanation, that enemy combatants tried by military 
commission did not deserve the protections afforded by the full 
application of the Military Rules of Evidence, was alluded to in a 
number of different ways by the Bush administration.  One such 
allusion was that, because the legal status of these enemy 
combatants is different from other individuals, the protections 
afforded them are also different.  Initially, the Bush 
administration’s view was that members of Al Qaeda and other 
enemy combatants did not enjoy the protections of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.110
 
 110. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(citing Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Statement by the 
Press Sec’y on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003)). 
  While the administration’s 
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stated policy was to treat these unlawful enemy combatants 
consistently with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions,111 the 
administration would have the exclusive power to decide just how 
close to the spirit of Geneva that treatment would fall.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this position in Hamdan.112  But even if the 
Court had upheld the Bush administration’s position and found 
the status of these enemy combatants to be legally unique, why 
does that different legal status necessarily result in a different and 
more relaxed application of the evidentiary rules?  At a minimum, 
the government should have been required to make some showing 
that the difference in legal status would be meaningful in the 
context of the determinations the tribunals would have to make on 
evidentiary issues.  The Bush administration never made that 
showing, relying instead upon the simple assertion that a difference 
in legal status is meaningful in the context of a tribunal’s 
determination of a detainee’s connection to terrorist activities.113
Another Bush administration contention focused on the 
identity of the detainees as alien enemy combatants sworn to 
support the terrorist cause.
 
114  The horrific experience of 
September 11th and the possibility that terrorists would strike again 
with even more deadly means and methods may have driven the 
administration to conclude that these suspects, as the 
representatives of Al Qaeda we have in custody, simply did not 
deserve the evidentiary protections we afford defendants in 
criminal trials and military courts-martial.  To afford them the full 
protections of the evidence rules, in other words, would be to 
dignify these individuals as somehow worthy of treatment above 
mere contempt.115
The problem, of course, is that adjusting the level of 
protection afforded these individuals in criminal and quasi-
criminal contexts, based primarily upon the moral assessment of 
   
 
 111.  See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, 
et al., Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), 
available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020207-2.pdf. 
 112. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006). 
 113. Id. at 646. 
 114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 115. As the Middle East historian Bernard Lewis observed, “[w]e of the West 
have often failed catastrophically in respect for those who differ from us . . . . But it 
is something for which we have striven as an ideal and in which we have achieved 
some success, both in practicing it ourselves and in imparting it to others.”  
BERNARD LEWIS, CULTURES IN CONFLICT: CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND JEWS IN THE AGE 
OF DISCOVERY 78 (1995).   
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/4
  
1502 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:4 
the individual’s alleged actions, reflects a policy long abandoned, 
and rightly so, in Anglo-American jurisprudence.116  As in any case 
in which an act condemned by the community has occurred, 
neither the community nor its governmental representatives has a 
special moral claim with respect to a particular individual until that 
person has been determined through fair procedures to be 
guilty.117
The willingness to depart from the rules of evidence in the 
military commissions suggests that these rules, which the Bush 
administration was so quick to abandon, either do not reflect the 
core values of what it means to have a fair trial, or that this category 
of suspect does not deserve a fair trial.  The rules of evidence, as 
reflected in both the federal and military rules, represent the 
collective wisdom of hundreds of years of experience, as well as 




If the rules of evidence reflect our values of what it means to 
have a fair trial, then their rejection must mean that enemy 
combatants tried by military commissions do not deserve a fair trial.  
We should reflect very carefully on this rationale.  If we adopt a 
similar rationale in trying suspected terrorists in future military 
commissions, then we would once again start down a very slippery 
slope.  Suppose the President can significantly limit a defendant’s 
fundamental right to a fair trial by abandoning the rules of 
evidence in favor of a general relevance standard because of who 
the defendant is, the defendant’s alleged crimes, or the difficulty in 
obtaining a conviction without abandoning the rules.  If the 
President is allowed this power, then these same steps may be taken 
to limit the protections provided by the rules of evidence to a 
service member or a citizen in a future situation where the 
President believes a similar justification exists.  To believe that 
constitutional protections would prevent this from ever occurring 
  It is fair to say that, at least to a certain extent, these 
rules reflect what Anglo-American jurisprudence establishes as 
essential components of a fair trial.   
 
 116. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (discussing repudiation 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence of the tactics of the Star Chamber and how, 
“[u]nder our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the 
accused . . . not by interrogation of the accused even under judicial safeguards, 
but by evidence independently secured through skillful investigation”). 
 117. See Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice, 109 HARV. L. REV. 487, 488–89 & 
n.10 (1995) (book review). 
 118. See FED. R. EVID. 102. 
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does not address the issue: constitutional standards, in particular 
criminal procedure protections, have almost always been 
interpreted to mean different things in different contexts.   
 We should also understand that the abandonment of these 
rules in favor of a general standard of relevancy would not impact 
both sides equally in military commissions.  First, because the 
government has the burden of proof and is responsible for 
introducing a sufficient quantum of evidence to obtain a 
conviction, it would benefit the most if the rules of admissibility are 
reduced to a standard of general relevance.  Because the 
prosecution has at its disposal the full investigative resources of the 
government, it is also in a better position to develop and admit 
evidence whose relevance is minimal at best.  This means that more 
evidence would be admitted and the fact finder would be able to 
make more tenuous inferences suggesting guilt.  The defendant, 
whose access to compulsory process is limited under the military 
commissions, would often be at a disadvantage and unable to 
counter the government’s evidence. 
Perhaps those who were charged with drafting the rules of 
evidence that were ultimately incorporated into the MMC 
recognized the dangerous precedent that had been set by earlier 
Bush administration efforts.  In response, they sought to restore 
some of the fundamental aspects of a fair trial by including many of 
the previously disregarded rules of evidence in the rules finally 
adopted for trial by military commission.  Or perhaps after 
suffering one defeat by the Supreme Court over evidentiary rules, 
the drafters were simply unwilling to risk another defeat.   
Whatever the reason for the final form of the MMC’s evidence 
rules, they did not restore all of the Military Rules of Evidence.  
Notably, the rules regarding hearsay evidence and authentication 
were significantly modified.119
 
 119. See MMC, supra note 98, pt. III, §§ VIII–IX.  
  Considering these modifications 
carefully, there may be another possible explanation for the 
military commissions’ departure from the Military Rules of 
Evidence.  Perhaps some of the current restrictions in the Military 
Rules of Evidence should no longer apply in the military context, at 
least when the application of certain rules could disrupt ongoing 
combat and other important national-security operations.  These 
specific modifications to the hearsay and authentication rules at 
least suggest this possibility. 
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The evidence rules under the MMC create a presumption for 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence.  The hearsay rules keep the 
same definitions for hearsay as set out in Military and Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801.120  The MMC, however, reverses Military Rule of 
Evidence 802 by stating that hearsay evidence may be admitted on 
the same terms as any other evidence.121  MMC Rule 803 provides 
that hearsay evidence may be admissible in one of two ways.122  First, 
the evidence may be admissible on the same terms as it is 
admissible in trial by general courts-martial.123  In other words, it is 
admissible under the exceptions now contained in rules 803 and 
804.  Second, even if the hearsay evidence does not meet a specific 
exception, the MMC makes hearsay admissible so long as adequate 
notice is provided to the opposing party.124  If the party opposing 
admissibility can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the hearsay evidence is unreliable, it is not admissible.125
With respect to the rules of authentication, the MMC rules also 
reflect a major change.  The sections of the Military Rules of 
Evidence governing authentication and identification
  This 
change makes all forms of hearsay presumptively admissible.   
126 are 
replaced by one simple rule.127  Rule 901 of the MMC states that 
“[e]vidence shall be admitted as authentic if the military judge 
determines that there is sufficient basis to find that the evidence is 
what it is claimed to be,” and if the “judge instructs the 
[commission panel] that they can consider any issue [of] 
authentication in determining the weight to give that evidence.”128
That the drafters of the MMC restored many of the Military 
Rules of Evidence in the military commissions with the exception of 
these two major modifications suggests that they felt that the 
traditional hearsay and authentication rules have no place in the 
military commissions. It should be noted here, too, that the MMC 
does allow for use of classified evidence, and the rules allow the 
   
 
 120. See MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 801.  Compare id. with FED. R. EVID. 801 (hearsay 
definition in Federal Rules of Evidence) and MIL.R. EVID. 801 (hearsay definition 
in Military Rules of Evidence). 
 121. MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 802.  Compare id. with MIL. R. EVID. 802 (disallowing 
admission of hearsay evidence unless rules provide otherwise). 
 122. See MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 803(a)–(b). 
 123. Id. 803(a). 
 124. Id. 803(b). 
 125. Id. 803(c). 
 126. See MIL. R. EVID. 901–03. 
 127. See MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 901. 
 128. Id.  
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defendant to view and have access to that evidence on terms very 
similar to Military Rule of Evidence 505.129
B. The Combat Rationale   
If national security is not the primary reason behind the 
significant relaxation of the hearsay and authentication rules in 
military commissions, and if the drafters of the MMC restored 
other evidentiary rules, many of which will help to ensure a 
fundamentally fair trial, it seems that these particular rule changes 
were made out of a belief that it would be too burdensome to 
require first-hand testimony and specific authentication procedures 
in military commissions.   
As used historically, and perhaps as initially envisioned in this 
most recent instance, military commissions often took place on the 
battlefield in the midst of ongoing combat operations.  In such an 
environment, formal requirements of authentication may have 
proven to be too burdensome and unnecessary since the fact finder 
is free to evaluate the evidence and give it whatever weight he or 
she determines is appropriate.  Likewise, the rules favoring direct 
testimony over hearsay evidence may not work in the heat of battle, 
where it is unreasonable and unrealistic to literally pull witnesses 
off the battle lines in order to testify, especially when their 
testimony can be obtained by less burdensome, if somewhat less 
reliable means.   
  This would suggest that 
national security and protecting sensitive evidence are not the 
primary motivations behind the major modifications to the hearsay 
and authentication rules. 
The most recent military commissions, however, did not take 
place on the battlefield or even in an active combat zone.  They 
took place thousands of miles away in the very secure detainee 
compound at Guantánamo Bay, far removed from the exigencies of 
battle.  That is not to say, however, that battlefield considerations 
are no longer a factor.  In military commissions cases, the evidence 
needed to convict a detainee of violations of the MCA would likely 
often come from people who are unavailable to testify, either 
because they cannot be located or because they are unwilling to 
testify.  Additionally, those witnesses who may be members of the 
military or other government agents and employees may be 
 
 129. Compare MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 505 (protection of classified information) 
with MIL. R. EVID. 505 (protection of classified information). 
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working in essential missions, and it would pose a major disruption 
if they were required to testify personally at a military commissions 
proceeding.  Similar disruptions to ongoing operations may also 
occur if more formal authentication procedures were required by 
the rules of evidence.   
In considering the modifications the drafters of the MMC 
made to the final rules of evidence applicable to military 
commissions, it can be argued that they took a pragmatic approach, 
modifying the hearsay and authentication rules so that trials by 
military commission could proceed without disrupting other on-
going military operations.  In essence, the MMC created a type of 
combat exception allowing for greater admissibility of both hearsay 
evidence and other evidence that may not meet the current 
standards of authentication set out in the Military Rules of 
Evidence.  Neither the President, nor Congress, nor the drafters of 
the MMC stated that the reason for these changes was to create a 
combat exception to the rules of evidence.  Nevertheless, this 
seems to be one practical consequence of the commissions’ 
evidence rules.   
The two-part question, then, is: (1) are these modifications to 
the hearsay and authentication rules necessary or desirable; and 
(2) should similar rules be adopted in future trials of suspected 
terrorists or future military commissions?  Intuitively, perhaps these 
changes make some sense.  The problem is that these changes do 
not seem to be based on any solid data or information.  In 
addition, since the Military Rules of Evidence were adopted in 
1980, there has not been any strong movement within the military 
legal community or within the larger military community for the 
creation of combat exceptions to the rules of evidence.  Creating 
these combat exceptions to the hearsay and authentication rules 
without giving the question more detailed study and analysis may 
have a number of unintended consequences.   
One such consequence is the impact that such a change might 
have on other trials.  If the need to create a combat exception to 
the Military Rules of Evidence is one possible rationale behind 
these final MMC rules, that same rationale for a relaxation of the 
hearsay and authentication rules can be made to virtually any court-
martial conducted on the battlefield or to any trial where live 
testimony and authentication procedures could disrupt other 
important governmental activities.  After all, it is not only trials 
conducted by military commission which could potentially disrupt 
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on-going military operations.  In fact, since many courts-martial are 
conducted much closer to the battlefield then the military 
commissions at Guantánamo Bay, the impact on on-going military 
operations by court-martial trials could potentially be even greater 
than the impact caused by military commissions.   
To date, few military legal experts, academics, or practitioners 
have suggested that the hearsay rules and the rules of 
authentication contained in the Military Rules of Evidence have 
proven to be unworkable in a battlefield environment.  The wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are the first prolonged engagements that the 
military has been involved in since the Military Rules of Evidence 
were codified.  When the dust settles on these wars and there is 
time for reflection and evaluation, some may argue for a kind of 
combat exception to the military rules along the lines of the 
commissions’ rules.  Certainly, the military commissions’ 
modification of the hearsay and authentication rules establishes a 
precedent for changes to the Military Rules of Evidence in the 
future.  To create such a precedent, however, without more careful 
and detailed study than has occurred to date is unwise. 
In considering the lessons we can learn from this most recent 
round of military commissions, we should be very cautious about 
turning to the commissions’ evidence rules as a precedent for 
changes to the Military Rules of Evidence.  The history of the UCMJ 
and the Military Rules of Evidence suggests that these rules and 
procedures were intended to be used across the entire spectrum of 
military operations because no combat exceptions were included.  
This approach reflected the view that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which served as the basis for the military rules, struck an 
appropriate balance between the needs of the military and the 
rights of the individual soldier.  This determination was the 
product of debate and deliberation among the drafters of the 
military rules.   
By contrast, it is hard to say that the rules of evidence for 
military commissions have enjoyed such careful deliberation.  As we 
have seen, the commissions’ evidence rules began with a basic 
relevancy rule in the President’s initial orders.  The rules contained 
in the MCA reflect that same basic approach and were drafted in 
haste after the Supreme Court invalidated the President’s 
unilateral military commissions process.  When the drafters of the 
MMC set out their final version of the rules of evidence for military 
commissions, they did not include an explanation or discussion as 
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to why the hearsay and authentication rules were so different from 
the military and federal rules.  Additionally, the promulgation of 
these rules for military commissions was not the product of public 
debate, and there is nothing to suggest that these changes are a 
response to legitimate concerns about the impact that the current 
hearsay and authentication rules have on on-going combat 
operations.  In short, the hearsay and authentication rules now 
contained in the MMC should have little, if any, precedential value 
to any future consideration of whether there is a need to create a 
combat exception to the Military Rules of Evidence.  For this same 
reason, if suspected terrorists are to be tried in some forum other 
then federal district court or military courts-martial, or if the 
creation of military commissions is contemplated again in the 
future, the evidence rules developed in this most recent military 
commissions system should have little precedential value.  If a 
combat exception to the Military Rules of Evidence is considered, 
then the consideration should be based on how effective these 
rules proved to be in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and how 
disruptive their application was to on-going combat operations.  To 
date, no study has been undertaken to explore this question.   
VI. CONCLUSION: THE ROAD AHEAD 
The recent experience with the rules of evidence in military 
commissions has given us an opportunity to reflect on whether 
procedures to try alleged foreign terrorists, as well as future military 
commissions procedures, should adopt rules of evidence consistent 
with the federal and military rules or if we should follow a different 
approach.  Looking back on the evidentiary scheme created for the 
most recent military commissions also gives us an opportunity to 
reflect on the application of the rules of evidence in military courts-
martial and other criminal prosecutions.   
Maybe the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence keep too 
much information from the fact finders, and perhaps the fact 
finder would reach more accurate and more just results if they had 
access to information that is often excluded under formalistic 
evidentiary rules.  Maybe many of these rules are not a reflection of 
our core values and are not necessary for a fair trial.  And maybe 
the rules have proven to be unworkable in a military or combat 
environment.  Perhaps the creation of the military commissions 
presented the first opportunity for us to start with a clean slate.  
Rather than forcing the trial process to be tied to arcane rules, 
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perhaps it is better to simply abandon the rules and in their place 
adopt a common-sense approach.   
Looking at the initial evidence rules proposed by the Bush 
administration as well as the rules ultimately settled on for military 
commissions, what is most striking is, first, how quickly the 
government abandoned well-recognized federal and military rules 
and in their place adopted a general rule of relevance.  It is also 
striking that no explanation or rationale accompanied these 
dramatic changes to the rules. 
Considering the haste with which these changes were made, 
and because there was virtually no explanation accompanying 
them, we are left on our own to try and piece together the reasons 
for the changes and ask whether they should serve as a useful 
precedent for the trial of suspected terrorists, for some future 
military commission, or as precedent for broader changes to the 
Federal and Military Rules of Evidence.  Much can be learned from 
this experience, and the most important lesson is what not to do in 
the future. 
This article argues that the reasons behind the Bush 
administration’s efforts at re-writing the rules of evidence for 
military commissions were twofold.  First, there was the belief that, 
to the extent the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence reflect 
core components of a fair trial, enemy combatants who were facing 
trial by military commission simply did not deserve these 
fundamental protections because of their actions.  The folly of this 
approach can be seen from the fact that the military commissions 
process has lacked legitimacy from its inception, and at every turn 
the Bush administration’s efforts were frustrated both by the 
judicial branch and in the court of public opinion.130
 
 130. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Jackie Northam, 
Obama Said Ready to Close Guantanamo, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99713003 (stating the 
lack of public support for military commissions is one reason why President 
Obama is unlikely to retain them). 
  Any efforts to 
create a separate tribunal process for the trial of suspected 
terrorists and any efforts to create a military commissions system in 
the future must not repeat this error.  The Obama administration 
or some future administration must engage in an honest and clear 
examination of the rationale for creating a separate tribunal 
process.  If the motivation is to deny these suspects the basic 
protections of a fair trial because of who they are or what they are 
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suspected of having done, then it is best not to even start down that 
road.   
This article maintains that the second reason for the changes 
to the evidence rules reflected in the MMC was the belief that some 
of the evidence rules are simply unworkable in a combat 
environment and that some combat or military exceptions to the 
rules of evidence should be created.  There may be some merit to 
this argument.  But here again the efforts of the Bush 
administration to create battlefield exceptions to the hearsay and 
authentication rules lack legitimacy, because these changes were 
not the result of careful study or analysis.  Rather, they seemed to 
be based on a hunch that these exceptions were needed.  Rule 
changes of this magnitude, based on hunches and assumptions that 
lack thorough and thoughtful consideration, should not enjoy any 
precedential value for future military commissions or in proposing 
changes to the Military Rules of Evidence. 
There is no question that in the efforts to try suspected foreign 
terrorists and other enemy combatants, the Bush administration 
faced a number of very complex legal issues.  As the Obama 
administration considers the best approach for the future, the way 
ahead is still difficult.  With respect to the rules of evidence that 
should apply to any future tribunal, there are some lessons from 
the past that can help point the way.  Any changes to the rules of 
evidence used in these proceedings must not be motivated by a 
belief that the suspects do not deserve a fair trial; nor should the 
rules be based on unsupported assumptions that the current rules 
of evidence are unworkable.   
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